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HOUSE SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

FROM: Office of Legislative Counsel
Central Intelligence Agency
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7 NOV 78

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		NOTES OF MARK FLANNAGAN 11112604-11112601	HSCA	S

19627

RECEIPT

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FORM 3772B
10-76

July 13, 1978

T. MARK FLANDERS

Heca

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CIA
7-13-78
Wash., D.C.

Inspector General's Report - 1977.

Subj: Comments on Book II, SSC Final Report - The Investigation of the Assassination of President Kennedy: Performance of the Intelligence Agencies

Introduction

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- states the principal theme of Book II is the possibility of retaliatory theory by Castro & that the CIA operations specifically may have caused any possible actions by Castro.
- the CIA note that many tensions between the U.S. & U.S.S.R. + Cuba existed at the time-
- p. 3 - states that the persons involved at a senior level in the invest of 1964 (Warren Comm) are no longer in the CIA
- primary reliance placed on the records; looked into all Cuban operations & carefully analyzed the content & nature with sp. attention to security contained in tabs B-G
- CIA also conducted an invest. looking at the "other end" - to see if a theoretical provocation theory could have occurred.
- feels that the SSC tried to make AMLASH fit this pattern. (p5)

11112654

- Report concludes that the WC must the possibility of Cuban or Soviet involvement & did not find it - since the WC did not report anything it did not exist "To hold differently would be to accept uncritically a social paranoia often prevalent today, which ~~SECRET~~ would hold that a significant number of government employees could engage in such a well-disciplined conspiracy to suppress evidence." (p5)

~~SECRET~~

p.6 - AMTRUNK operation, started in 1963,
- purpose - join dissident elements in Cuban
leadership to effort to oust Castro. - plan
is developing; little progress during JFK's life.
In 1965, it was believed to be compromised &
CIA withdrew from the operation.

- states that there are basic questions about
the security of the operation. - Carter
cited have known from the beginning.
- since it did not develop momentum until after
JFK's death, probably not needed.

p.6 AMLASH - SSC says that this operation
planned Castro's assas. preceding the
murder of JFK; the CIA holds otherwise.
"prior to the Russ' assassination not only
had CIA not agreed to give any support
to AMLASH /1, but had rejected his
proposals to assass. Castro." (p 7)

11112655

- Rep. says that the SSC was offered
this confirming evidence but dismissed it
out of hand as false - SSC would only
admit that AMLASH /1 was at
least inadvertent in his actions. Rep
says that the SSC suggests that he "may
have been acting for Castro as a provocateur,
to lead the US into a plot against Castro's
life which is how ~~he~~ was then to provide
Castro with the justification to order
President Kennedy's assassination." (p 7)

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- Rep. says that had Castro learned of AMLASH /

~~SECRET~~

he would only know that an inconclusive relationship existed.

TAB A

- ① - response to Book II object - study group established to review the problem - chaired by a rep. from the D of I & - also consisted of members from CI staff, LA Division, & OS. (p.1)

Two points emphasized:

- 1) "to conduct a full review of information and operations" on the Cuban target to identify any activity that might relate to the assassination of Pres. Kennedy, and
- 2) to review the possibility that CIA activities against Cuba, side by their nature, caused Castro to order the assassination of President Kennedy." (p. 1-2)

- main file for the second need is
LA DIVISION }
CI STAFF } Directorate of Operations

- also less voluminous files need in OS &
F.O. (p. 2)

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L4 DIVISION - file review from 1 Jan 61
to 1 Jan 65. (p.2)

- research group composed of 5 full-time
researchers, a group leader & a task
force supervisor - an additional 4
researchers participated in different phases.
(p.2)

Types & Number of Files Recd. (p.3)

(1) Operational

(601 with findings and 1,128 1,729
with no findings)

(2) Subject files

(186 with findings + 361 547
with no findings)

(3) Celta Policy File 101

(4) Chief, WH Division Chrono File) 37
(TASK FORCE W CHRONOS)

(5) Official 201 Dossiers

100-plus

total 2,514

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- the NYI also note that as a result of a memorandum prepared by the Cigar desk, in August 1975, they had traces of the name that appeared in the so-called Black book that Castro passed to McGovern. (p 4)

C I STAFF

- assigned one senior officer to review the files in LHO.

"Overall File" - so called - now fills 57 volumes - comprises some 142 file folder and port folios - has also accumulated some 50 supplemental files.

- this is now the Agency's central repository for info & documentation, a file of LHO.

- b. Agency's role in the invol 1963-64
- c. testimony by various Agency officers before several commissions & committees
- d. FOIA request responses. (p 6)

11112658

Office of Security

- assigned one officer to identify material; included volumes in LHO, AMASH, various and connected with the Criminal Underworld Plot, and a collection of names concerning name traces conducted at the time of the Garrison investigation. p 8

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Office of Ins General

- two members of staff - also employed
on a contract a retired employee who had
served as a special case officer in Mexico city
during the period preceding JFK's death
& during the investigation afterwards. - conducted
an extensive review of all Mex city records. p 9

~~SECRET~~

Terms of Reference agreement 4 Aug 76

p. 6 - signed by

S.D. Breck Pridge

OIG

Robert Wall CI

William Stubbs LA Division

Raymond Beardson OS

TAB B CIA Performance ON THE INQUIRIES

p.1 - says that Book II of the SCC Final Report
portrayed a pattern of neglect not
supported by the evidence.

11112653

- mentions "D"

AMLASH - p(2)

Oswald's brief p. 3 - 5

- this section deal with Book II allegations
of mishandling various aspects of
the investigation - it does not
deal with the resolution ideas

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p.10 - mention the two Cabana flights
to Havana from Mexico City on 22 November
& 27 Nov 1963 -

p.11 - CIA conducted regular surveillance of
Cabana flights - filing cable reports to HQG.
- one unilateral CIA surveillance team -
LIFIRE - reported on departure & arrivals.

p.11 - also, a telephone operation (LIE NUOY)
against the Cuban embassy provided
transcripts of conversations with the
Cubana Office & the Mex. Airport Control
Office.

TABC CIA OPERATIONS AGAINST CUBA

p.6 - areas of operational activity

1. Oper. directed against Cuban
leadership - AMTRUNK

11112660

2. Oper. involving the criminal underworld

3. Other reports to assassinate Castro.

Operations AMTRUNK - P-7

- to develop capability for splitting the
leadership of Cuba & eventual overthrow
never reached the point of implementation -

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p. 7 early 1963 - two Cuban exiles - wished to change Cuba
{ Nestor Antonio Morono Lopez
Enrique Cayardo Lora
developed operational concept "Leonard Plan"

p. 8 - assoc of Morono was Jorge Aybaroyce Volsky - in Miami in 1961.

p. 8 Cayardo & Morono - discussed plan with Volsky - Volsky then discussed it with Tadeus Wistold Szule, NY TIMES

p. 8 - Szule had developed friendship with many Cubans and Ambassador John C. Wilcy. Szule reportedly could see both Kennedys & Bundy any time he wanted.

- early '63 - Szule arranged an int. in Nash with Mr. Richard Goodwin, a White House advisor

11112661

Volsky & Szule then met with Robert Hershko, a senior official in the Dep't of State, who presented the coup to the CIA with approval. CIA assigned it to Miami station - known as AMTRUNK

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p. 9 AMTRUNK - conceived as identifying key personnel in Cuban Armed forces who could be

~~SECRET~~

used to overthrow the Castro regime.

p.9 - by Aug., 1963, events had still not progressed far

early Sept 1963 AMTAWK had 3
intelligence sources in Cuba:

Miguel A. Diaz Salgue
Ramon Guin Hector Robello
Modesto Orozco Basulto

One of them sources, Guin, was closer
to AMTASH/. p.9

- nothing developed over many months; by
1965 its security had been seriously
jeopardized & the decision was made
to end all connection. (p.10)

p.11 - CIA say they dismiss this operator
because of its weakness from the beginning -
say that Szulc & Volsky are highly
suspect & are discredited - also one
other person

~~SECRET~~ 11112662

Tad Szulc - suspect since '48 when FBI
records said he was a Communist -
his daughter, Nico Ic Szulc, reportedly
an anti-Communist. She is believed
to be an agent of the Cuban D.G.I.
doubts about Tad Szulc are unconfirmed

~~SECRET~~

but still alive.

P-11 Jorge Agustín Volsky - like Aguirre, of Polish origin; Volsky & Aguirre became acquainted during 59-60 in Cuba. suspected of being a Communist, not confirmed.

P-12 José Ricardo Rabel Nunez

P-13 involved in AMTRAK ~~&~~ threats to the FM WAVE station - accusations that he was a Cuban agent - never proven.

P-14 CIA says there was very little planning and no ~~so~~ concrete planning of AMTRAK during JFK's life.

11112663

NEW CONSIDERATIONS ON THE SYNDICATE OPERATION

P-14 - mentions a by-line story by Paul Meskin in the NY Times, 20-25 April, 1975, which quoted Frank Sturgis.

Daily
Press

~~SECRET~~

Sturgis says the third assassination scheme involved a bomb in Castro's office - Sturgis says he knew Juan Ortíz.

~~SECRET~~

p. 15 - CIA says this news article is the first public reference to Juan Orta's role of assassin in the plan against Castro.

p16 - Orta was the man the CIA had, in the operation with the syndicate, to kill Castro.

says that the plan failed (poison) because Orta lost his position in January, 1961 - prior to delivery of the pills in late Feb or early March 1961.

p.16 says that Orta's sole career when he took refuge in the Venezuelan Embassy in Havana in 1961- April. left Cuba in 1964 & settled in Miami in Feb 1965.

11112664

on p 15 the rpt says that Alwynne claimed on a number of occasions that he had ~~as~~ each ~~special relationship~~ was an employee of the CIA, although no record of any such relationship.

"He was in contact with some of the CIA Cuban employees in the Miami area, but had no direct relationships with the Agency."

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

p. 17 - rpt says that because Sturgis knew of Orla's involvement in some plot it raises the question of whether Sturgis may have been a source of info to Castro.

p. 17 - New York Daily News - 13 June 76 - refers to possible relationship b/w Sturgis & Trappante - also mentions Norman Rothman as a gambling partner of Trappante.

p. 17 - says that it is interesting to note that Juan Orla's availability to the Mafia was understood to be due to his many lost payoffs that he had received from gambling interests. Then goes on to say two ways for Sturgis & Orla to have known each other
1. mutual gambling activities
2. heads of gambling activities

11112665

p. 18 NY Daily News - 1976 - story that Marie Lorey in 1960 acted for Sturgis in an attempt to assassinate Castro. This story says that soon after her mission forced the CIA recruited mafia mobsters to kill Castro.

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Lorey claims that the plan involved the use of poison pills concealed

~~SECRET~~

In a jar of face cream, she said they dissolved & could not be used.

p. 18 - Red next mentions Oct 18, 1960 FBI memo re: Grancana - concludes that it involves a woman to kill Castro but that the date is too early for the CIA work. (no delivery until late Feb, 1961). Red says that the syndicate may have been moving on its own.

p. 19 Following collapse of CIA's access to Castro through Orla, Roselli said he knew Cuban exile leader, Verma, who might join. - mentions that Verma not satisfied with the CIA support of the exile movement to date & that the Miami Station suspected he was not keeping bargain with agency.

- concludes that Verma may have already been involved in plots with major other CIA approached him. Two FBI rph bear on this:

- 1) 21 Dec 60 - com and support for some Cuban,

p. 20 2) 18 Jan 61 - Verma one of those rec. support, not confirmed.

~~SECRET~~

11112666

~~SECRET~~

p20 - rpt says that although the operator with name called off after BOP (4-61), it seemed like it was still going on other re-activated in April, 1962.

p26 Agent messages in 1961 concerning Plans to Kill Castro.

p26 3 messages - seem to relate to same plan - same agents.

27 March 1961 - sent by an Agency asset, AMBRONC/5. - proposed sabotage of an illus. co. in Havana; could be coordinated with attempt against Fidel or public appearance at Sports Palace." said that the attempt "against Fidel (s) is accordance with general plan." No record if this was answered.

p27 29 March 61 - same agent sent another message - said plan was scheduled for April 9th. Castro to talk at palace & "assassination attempt at said place (will be) followed by a general pd shutting off of main electric plants in Havana."

~~SECRET~~

answered on 30 March - saying major effort should be launched on date you are selected - the message addressed the general issue &

~~SECRET~~

made no comment on proposal to
Kill Castro.

5 April 1961 - presumably from same
agent - mentions that the persons
he had been directed to contact only
had arms for 50 men. "While
stating that the sabotage of the electric
company and 'possibly attempt on
Fidel' would be carried out 9 April,
he emphasized that to do so would
make it impossible to maintain a
clandestine organization in Cuba;
"Your military aid is decisive. If
it does not come that date we are lost."

- no indicators that the message was answered;
no further reference found.

P 27 - rpt mentions that the case officer
responsible for one of them as well as the
files were reviewed.

AMBIRONC/5 - agent who sent out the
message outlining the proposed sabotage
& attempt against Castro.

P 28 201 File open 15 July 1960

OA issued 31 JAN 62.

arrested 29 May 1962

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executed 30 August 62.

reported that he never admitted being CIA;

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~~SECRET~~

name not in the book given Sir McGovern
by Castro.

p 29 AMCOAX/1 - one of them AMBRONC/5 was
told to contact P.O.A 5 Jan 61 -
arrested 17 Aug 61 - serving 30 yr
sentence - in book for Sir McGovern -
mission: organize paramilitary
activities in Cuba

p 29 AMSUB/1 - another one AMBRONC/5
told to contact for his general plan
in April 1961.
arrested July 1961 - 30 yr sentence
name or last given to Sir McGovern
mission: organize resistance groups.

p 30 AMPONIC/7
- arrested ~~20~~ 23 April 61 -
30 yr term - name among them
given McGovern - mission: organizing
resistance groups.

11112669

p. 31 - the 9 April 61 mission by
AMBRONC/5 did not come off -
his mission was to organize resistance
groups - he had no express mission
to hit Castro personally, although
it is clear no specific objection was
raised when he mentioned attempting
to do so.

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~~SECRET~~

- the other men, none of whom had an assassination mission, are now serving 30 yr terms.

p 32 another agent message did 4 June 61 - asked about a man who called himself Moro's son of the Italian Embassy - claimed to work for U.S. intelligence & to be in touch with me Martin Elena & others - who " has plans for an invasion within 30 days, after the killing of Fidel."

a reply did 6 June, stated that this info was untrue -

- the originator of the agent message cannot be identified.

p 33 another message 3 May 61 - from a member of Rev Recovery ~~is~~ Pre movement in Cuba said " will try to kill Fidel today" a reply 4 May told the agent & his companions to lay low - 11112670

- no follow-up messages -
agent possibly AMPLIB/1, but his ~~old~~ mission did not include assassination

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~~SECRET~~

P28 - a debriefing of AMBRUN/C/5 -
Nov 1960 - revealed he had contact
with people who had plotted killing Castro -
claimed to have made similar plan -

TABD - AMLASH

p1 - lot says that the ~~the~~ SEC report
implies that AMLASH was either an agent
for Castro, with the mission of provoking
a plot against Castro which in turn provided
Castro with the justification to kill Kennedy
(pp 3, 74, & 79 of SEC) or that AMLASH/1 was
so incisive that the operators became known
to Castro who then sought revenge.

Response by CIA - neither theory correct -
believe that the character of the
relationship b/w CIA & AMLASH before JFK's
death was so "insubstantial and inconclusive"
that it provided no basis for AMLASH/1
to feel that he had any tangible CIA support
for plotting against Castro." p 1-2.
- little for him to report on back.

Agency understanding of the Operation

March, 1959 - AMLASH/1 reported as telling
Castro of his dissatisfaction with the
situation in Cuba.

11112671

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~~SECRET~~

March 1961 - AMLASH/1 met in Mexico City by a CIA case officer stationed there - occasion - the Latin America Conference on National Sovereignty, Emancipation, & Peace.

- meeting arranged by AMWHP/1 - long time friend of AMLASH/1.

p3 - a day after in July, 1961, when gave a general review of operations against Cubans, described the meeting.

The station made an unsuccessful approach to AMLASH/1 - AMLASH apparently did not report the incident to his superiors, however.

August, 1961 - AMWHP/1 rptd plan by AMLASH/1 to attend the French National Student Union Cultural Festival - AMLASH/1 wanted to meet a friend of the case officer's. Do not know if the contact occurred.

June, 1962 - rpt that AMLASH/1 would go to via Prague to World Youth Festival in Helsinki. AMLASH/1 was rpt as wanting to defect; would pass through Paris en route & hoped to meet AMWHP/1 there.

~~SECRET~~

11112672

p3 - the FBI, who knew of AMWHP/1's assoc with CIA, ~~said~~ met AMWHP/1 in Miami and took steps for him to be referred to GA should he contact Paris Legal Attor

~~SECRET~~

p4. July 1962 - CIA contacted AMW41P1 - who said he was angry with the way the CIA handled the "planned defection" in Paris in August 1961. Plan were made for ~~the~~ a CIA case officer & AMW41P1 to travel to Helsinki and anywhere else to secure defection.

1st series of meetings with AMWASH1, held in Helsinki on 1 Aug 62. AMWASH1, said if he could do something really significant he was interested in returning to Cuba to carry on the fight.

p4. Security hazard of meeting in Helsinki too often led to meetings in Stockholm and Copenhagen.

AMWASH1, next met on 16-17 Aug in Paris - AMW41P1, & 2 case officers present.

AMWASH1, gave SW training & supplies -

20 August AMWASH1, taken to Southern France for a demolition demonstration.

11112673

p5. Case officer rpt on 17 August -
 "I have no vehicles give [AMWASH1] physical elimination mission as requirement but recognising this something he could or might try to carry out on his own initiative." ~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Headquarters upped next day:

"Strongly concurred that no phys. elimination
missions be given AMLASHH/1" P5

29 Aug 62 - AMLASHH/1 left Prague by air for
Havana - last time he was met until he
left Cuba 15 September, 1963.

Comment -

note that AMLASHH/1, not a recruited
agent during the above times - nor was he
ever for that matter - as OA was
never granted for this purpose.

- by end of Aug 1962 - CIA relationship with
AMLASHH had made no real progress.

- over a year passed until next contact by CIA

P5.

- critical period : 5 Sept - 22 Nov 63.

AMLAASHH/1 attended Collegiate Game 18
Porto Alegre, Brazil from 5 Sept
1963, as a rep. of the
Cuban gov.

11112674

p6

- met there by AMWHRP/1 & by the CIA
case officer who was to take over the
relationship with him. ~~SECRET~~

AMLAASHH/1 said he had written two
SW messages (only 1 had been received)

~~SECRET~~

- CIA say they did not contact AMELASHI for over one year because he never left Cuba.

p 6

- at this point (5 Sept 1963) there was "no evidence" (that)... an assassin's operator was intended, and it was "quite clear that it was not under consideration."

- the problem at that time was how to deal with the man.

- CIA did not feel AMELASHI was reliable enough to rely on at that point - viewed as a person of "uncertain ~~capabilities~~ capabilities"

p 8

7 Sept 63 cable - CIA feels this cable left things very much up in the air - cable said "AMELASHI still feels there only two ways accomplish change either inside job or invasion he realistic enough to consider latter out of question. According AMWHP, AMELASHI still "waiting for US reveal plan of action".

11112675

p 8

the SSC thinks that inside job referred to something against Castro; the CIA say it is a general comment about how to bring about change.

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- also, CIA says AMASH carrying a US plan of action - says this signifies that theory was still up in the air.

- CIA notes that at this point Book II states that "Characterization of this phase of the AMASH operation is disputed" (p1 footnote 17). CIA says any dispute only arises in the eye of the SSC.

SSC

p9 - also mentions an interview Castro held with an AP reporter, DANIEL Harker, in which Castro said anti-castro terrorist had the support of U.S. leaders.
intended inference - AMASH, may have reported to Castro what the SSC characterized as their assassination plots. -

CIA response - "Castro's remarks at that time could not have stemmed from anything said to AMASH, by CIA officers as they prepared nothing & understood nothing" - p: 10.

1112676

AMASH, - Paris - 14 Sept - to attend a meeting of ALLIANCE FRANCAISE trip actually for an extended vacation, where he intended to report to Castro later.

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~~SECRET~~

or 16 Sept - he wrote AMWASH, & said (as)
he did not intend to be interviewed by your
friend again. (refers to CIA case officer)

3 Oct 63 - case officer still went to Paris -

11 Oct 63 - case officer called HQ - ~~said~~
that AMLASTH, claimed to have the
pre-people & equip to overthrow Castro
w/out U.S. assistance.

p 11. AMLASTH, repd as making a meeting with
a senior official, preferably Robert Kennedy,
to be sure of U.S. support.

21 Oct cable to Wash repd 17 Oct meeting
with AMLASTH, - want U.S. support
if his op is successful.

Desmond Fitzgerald - then Chief of Sp. Affairs Staff -
going to France on other business - &
undertook to meet AMLASTH - plan for
the meeting:

11112677

1) Fitzgerald will represent self a personal
representative of Robert F. Kennedy who
travelled to Paris for specific purpose of
meeting (AMLASTH) and giving him assurances
of full U.S. support if there is
a change of the present govt in Cuba. //

p. 11

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

29 Oct - Fitz - AMWASH/1 in Paris -
 rep as a spokesman for Robert F. Kennedy.
 3rd person at meeting - case officer who was
 the interpreter.

13 Nov - memorandum summarizing the meeting -
 goal → support forthcoming only after
 a real coup has been effected and
 the group is position to request U.S. support

p 12

p.13 Fitz recalled that AMWASH/1 repeatedly had
 reference to the need for an assassination weapon.
 He wanted a high-power rifle with telescopic
 lens, a sonic device which could be
 used to kill Castro from a distance. Fitz
 said he rejected this request.

NOTE: One can officer's memo did not
 refer specifically to assassination or
 a weapon. merely says that nothing
 of operational nature discussed; AMWASH/1
 did ~~request, however,~~ desire to know,
 however, what technical support could
 be given.

~~SECRET~~

11112678

14 NOV 63 - AMWASH/1 met in N.Y.C. → rpt
 on AMWASH/1' reaction to the Oct 29 meeting -
~~he~~ & he related:
 - not happy about no tech. support.
 - could not understand why they would
 not give him technical support

p14

~~SECRET~~
CIA note that at the point it was clear that AMLASH was told there would be no US support until after the fact - contrary to statement by SEC (p 18) of Final Report to the effect that it was not clear how AMLASH /1 anticipated the put off by Fitzgerald.

- also cites July 1964 FBI report as evidence that AMLASH knew he had been turned down on Oct 29 by Fitzgerald.

p15

following the 14 Nov meeting with AMLASH /1, the CIA reversed what could be due to maintain contact with AMLASH -

on 19 Nov 63, Fitz approved telling AMLASH /1 he would be given a cache inside Cuba - it could, if he exceeded it, include high personnel after w scope.

19 Nov - AMLASH /1 told CIA officer he planned to return to Cuba

20 Nov - Hdq cabled Paris & requested that AMLASH delay departure so permit one more meeting which AMLASH requested.

~~SECRET~~ 11112679

~~SECRET~~

that same day AMASH agreed to remain -

- the CIA says still no specific offer was made - says that AMASH, agreed to stay "if it is something interesting". CIA officer replied "he could not assure it is interesting but that it was to be a meeting which AMASH had requested."

P 16

- CIA officer arrived from Wash. in Miami on the morning of the 22nd - met AMASH, late in the afternoon - learned of Kennedy's arrival as they left the meeting - probably were meeting when Kennedy was shot.

p16 - Conclusion by CIA

¹⁾ Whatever the relationship with AMASH, following the death of President Kennedy, there is every indication that during President Kennedy's life AMASH, had no basis for believing that he had CIA support for much of anything. Were he a provocateur reporting to Castro, or if he was merely a teller & knew what he knew, he had no factual basis for leaving or reporting any actual CIA plot & directed against Castro.

P 16

~~SECRET~~

11112680

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Op 23 AMIASTH was arrested - does not say when served
10 yrs of a 30 yr term - his public trial
did not mention his agency assoc. for March 1961 to
Nov. 1964.

also, other Castro - Mc Jones list of people -
AMIASTH, among those - the reported period,
however, did not include March 1961 to
Nov. 64.

IG Report - 1977 - completed. - all tabs
(A - G).

11112681

~~SECRET~~